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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment for 
defendants Pennsylvania Department of Corrections 
(PADOC), State Correctional Institute at Rockview (SCI- 
Rockview), and former Superintendent of SCI-Rockview, 
Joseph Mazurkiewicz, in a 42 U.S.C. S 1983 civil rights 
lawsuit brought against them by Dorothy Singletary, the 
mother of Edward Singletary, a prisoner who committed 
suicide while incarcerated at Rockview. The plaintiff does 
not appeal from the grant of summary judgment for PADOC 
and SCI-Rockview. She does appeal the District Court's 
grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant 
Mazurkiewicz, but there is plainly no merit to this challenge 
for there is no evidence that Mazurkiewicz exhibited 
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deliberate indifference to Edward Singletary's medical 
needs. 
 
In her original complaint, the plaintiff also included as 
defendants "Unknown Corrections Officers." The only 
chance for the plaintiff to prevail depends on her ability to 
succeed in: (1) amending her original complaint to add as 
a defendant Robert Regan, a psychologist at SCI-Rockview, 
against whom the plaintiff has her only potentially viable 
case; and (2) having this amended complaint relate back to 
her original complaint under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 15(c)(3) so that she overcomes the defense of the 
statute of limitations. Rule 15(c)(3) provides for the "relation 
back" of amended complaints that add or change parties if 
certain conditions are met, in which case the amended 
complaint is treated, for statute of limitations purposes, as 
if it had been filed at the time of the original complaint. 
 
The District Court denied the plaintiff 's motion for leave 
to amend because it concluded that the amended complaint 
would not meet the conditions required for relation back 
under 15(c)(3). Rule 15(c)(3) has two basic parts, both of 
which must be met before relation back is permitted. First, 
15(c)(3)(A) requires that the party that the plaintiff seeks to 
add has received, within a certain time period, sufficient 
notice of the institution of the action that the party is not 
prejudiced. In addition to actual notice (which is not 
claimed here) Rule 15(c)(3)(A) cognizes two means of 
imputing the notice received by the original defendants to 
the party sought to be added: (i) the existence of a shared 
attorney between the original and proposed new defendant; 
and (ii) an identity of interest between these two parties. 
Second, 15(c)(3)(B) requires that the party sought to be 
added knew or should have known that, but for a mistake, 
the plaintiff would have named him in the original 
complaint. 
 
We conclude that the District Court was correct in ruling 
that the amended complaint did not meet the notice 
requirements of Rule 15(c)(3)(A). The plaintiff cannot avail 
herself of the "shared attorney" method of imputing notice 
to Regan because the defendants' attorney was not 
assigned to this case until after the relevant notice period 
under Rule 15(c)(3). Furthermore, the "identity of interest" 
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method is not open to the plaintiff because Regan was not 
high enough in the administrative hierarchy of SCI- 
Rockview to share sufficient interests with any of the 
original defendants. 
 
The District Court also found that the plaintiff did not 
meet the requirement of Rule 15(c)(3)(B)--that Regan knew 
(or should have known) that, but for a mistake, the plaintiff 
would have named him in the original complaint. The 
correct legal interpretation of 15(c)(3)(B) is not settled, and 
it is unclear whether the plaintiff 's original complaint, 
which included as defendants "Unknown Corrections 
Officers," meets 15(c)(3)(B)'s mistake requirement. More 
precisely, because the plaintiff simply did not know of 
Regan's identity, it is an open question whether failure to 
include him originally as a defendant was a "mistake" 
under Rule 15(c)(3)(B). Resolution of the question whether 
lack of knowledge can constitute a mistake is important in 
civil rights cases. For example, a person who was subjected 
to excessive force by police officers might not have seen the 
officers' name tags, and hence would likely need discovery 
to determine the names of his attackers, although he 
cannot get discovery until he files his S 1983 complaint. If 
this person were prevented from having his complaint relate 
back when he sought to replace a "John Doe" or"Unknown 
Police Officers" in his complaint with the real names of his 
assailants, then he would have to file his complaint 
substantially before the running of the statute of limitations 
on his claim in order to avoid having his claim end up 
being barred. This would render the S 1983 statute of 
limitations much shorter for this person than it would be 
for another complainant who knows his assailants' names. 
 
Although there seems to be no good reason for the Rules 
of Civil Procedure to treat two such similarly-situated 
plaintiffs so differently, in most Courts of Appeals the 
naming of "unknown persons" or "John Does" (the 
functional pleading equivalent of "unknown persons") as 
defendants in an original complaint does not meet 
15(c)(3)(B)'s mistake requirement. In our one case to 
consider the issue this Court implied (though we did not 
squarely hold) that such "John Doe complaints"1 do meet 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. For simplicity's sake, for the rest of this opinion we will refer to 
complaints that list as defendants "John Does," "Unknown Persons," or 
their functional equivalents as "John Doe complaints." 
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this mistake requirement. But even if the mistake 
requirement is met in this case, it is not at all clear that 
Regan knew or should have known that the original 
complaint would have included him since the complaint 
named "Unknown Corrections Officers," and Regan is a 
staff psychologist, not a corrections officer, at SCI- 
Rockview. 
 
It is clear that the plaintiff does not meet Rule 
15(c)(3)(A)'s notice requirement, and hence we need not 
decide the thorny issues outlined in the preceding two 
paragraphs. However, because the position taken by the 
other Courts of Appeals on Rule 15(c)(3)(B)'s "mistake" 
requirement would seem to lead to seriously inequitable 
outcomes, we suggest to the Judicial Conference Advisory 
Committee on Civil Rules that it amend the language of 
Rule 15(c)(3)(B) so as to clearly provide that the 
requirements of that section of the Rule can be met in 
situations in which the plaintiff seeks to replace a"John 
Doe" or "Unknown Person" with the name of a real 
defendant. As we further explain infra at note 5, such an 
amendment, which is supported by the weight of scholarly 
commentary, would make Rule 15(c)(3) fit more closely with 
the overall tenor and policy of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
 
I. 
 
Edward Singletary was serving a 6-12 year sentence at 
SCI-Rockview for his conviction of rape. In November 1995, 
Singletary was transferred to the maximum security 
restricted housing unit (MSRHU) of SCI-Rockview as a 
result of "threatening an employee or family with bodily 
harm." Over the next ten months, Singletary became 
increasingly agitated, acting hostilely to the staff and 
accusing them of tampering with his food and mail. During 
this period, Singletary was given chances to leave the 
MSRHU and re-enter the general population unit of SCI- 
Rockview, but he refused each time. 
 
During his stay in the MSRHU, Singletary was seen 
weekly by a counselor, monthly by a three-person Program 
Review Committee, and by medical and psychological staff 
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as needed. A staff psychiatrist, Dr. Abdollah Nabavi, 
prescribed an anti-depressant to help Singletary with his 
sleeplessness and anxiety. Nabavi also offered Singletary 
Trilafon, an anti-psychotic drug, because he "felt 
[Singletary] was agitated, he was over suspicious, he was 
just very uncomfortable in the environment. . . . I think he 
was [psychotic]. If he was not, he was very close to being 
psychotic." Dep. of Dr. Nabavi at 31-32. Singletary, 
however, refused the Trilafon. 
 
On October 3, 1996, Singletary became agitated when he 
was told to remove some magazines that had accumulated 
in his cell, and he threatened a prison officer. Because of 
the threat, the next day Singletary was transferred to a cell 
in the "Deputy Warden" (DW) building with the approval of 
the prison Superintendent, defendant Joseph Mazurkiewicz. 
After placement in a DW cell, Singletary was seen on 
October 4, 1996 by Kevin Burke, a psychiatrist consultant 
for SCI-Rockview, and by Robert Regan, a psychological 
services staff member and the person whom Dorothy 
Singletary seeks to add as a defendant. Regan was working 
as a "psychological service specialist" at SCI-Rockview at 
this time; his duties included the psychological testing and 
assessment of inmates, parole evaluations, group therapy, 
mental health intervention, and suicide risk evaluation and 
prevention. Regan did not have any administrative or 
supervisory duties at the prison. Beginning in late 1994, 
Regan had met with and evaluated Singletary on a weekly 
basis. 
 
In their meetings with Singletary on October 4, Regan 
and Burke talked separately with him to assess his mental 
state. Singletary vehemently denied to both of them at that 
time that he was suicidal. On the basis of these 
examinations, neither Regan nor Burke saw any reason to 
take further precautions for Singletary. Just after midnight 
on October 6, 1996, Singletary committed suicide by 
hanging himself with a bedsheet. 
 
On October 6, 1998, Dorothy Singletary filed in the 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania a 
S 1983 deliberate indifference lawsuit alleging cruel and 
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment 
along with pendent state law claims for wrongful death. 
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Named as defendants were PADOC, SCI-Rockview, 
Mazurkiewicz, and "Unknown Corrections Officers." The 
action was ordered transferred to the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania on January 12, 1999 to correct a venue 
deficiency, and that order and the original file were officially 
docketed by the Middle District on February 16, 1999. On 
April 16, 1999, PADOC and SCI-Rockview moved for 
judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(c), and on May 28, 1999, the District Court 
granted this motion in part by dismissing Singletary's 
S 1983 claims against these defendants on Eleventh 
Amendment grounds, but denied their motion to dismiss 
the pendent state claims on sovereign immunity grounds. 
 
The parties then conducted discovery, and on June 23, 
2000, the defendants moved for summary judgment. On 
July 28, 2000, about a week after filing her response to the 
summary judgment motion, the plaintiff moved to amend 
her complaint to add Regan as a defendant. In two orders 
dated September 20, 2000, the District Court: (1) denied 
the plaintiff leave to amend her complaint to add Regan as 
a defendant on the grounds that that claim would be 
barred by the statute of limitations because it did not meet 
the conditions for relation back in Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 15(c)(3); (2) granted summary judgment for 
defendant Mazurkiewicz on the deliberate indifference claim 
on the basis that the plaintiff had not presented any 
evidence of what Mazurkiewicz knew or should have known 
about Edward Singletary; (3) granted summary judgment 
for defendants PADOC and SCI-Rockview on the plaintiff 's 
pendent state law claims because they were barred by the 
Eleventh Amendment; and (4) dismissed the remaining 
state law claims without prejudice because there were no 
federal law claims remaining in the lawsuit. This appeal 
followed. 
 
II. 
 
We find the plaintiff 's assertion that the District Court 
erred in granting summary judgment to defendant 
Mazurkiewicz to be clearly lacking in merit and dispose of 
it in the margin.2 We thus turn to Singletary's contention 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The District Court granted summary judgment for Mazurkiewicz 
because it found that the plaintiff had not presented any evidence that 
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that the court erred by not granting her leave to amend her 
complaint to add Regan as a defendant. We review a district 
court's decision granting or denying leave to amend a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
tended to show that Mazurkiewicz had been deliberately indifferent to 
Edward Singletary's medical needs as that concept has been developed 
in Supreme Court and Third Circuit case law. Summary judgment is 
proper if there is no genuine issue of material fact and if, viewing the 
facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(c); 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). Although the initial burden 
is on the summary judgment movant to show the absence of a genuine 
issue of material fact, "the burden on the moving party may be 
discharged by `showing'--that is, pointing out to the district court--that 
there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case" 
when the nonmoving party bears the ultimate burden of proof. Celotex, 
477 U.S. at 325. 
 
The general standard for a S 1983 deliberate indifference claim made 
against a prison official is set forth in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 
(1994), which focuses on what the official actually knew: "a prison 
official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying 
an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows 
of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety." Id. at 
837. In the context of a deliberate indifference claim based on failure to 
provide adequate medical treatment, "[i]t is well-settled that claims of 
negligence or medical malpractice, without some more culpable state of 
mind, do not constitute `deliberate indifference.' " Rouse v. Plantier, 
182 
F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 
The plaintiff 's basic argument on deliberate indifference is that 
Mazurkiewicz authorized Edward Singletary's transfer to a disciplinary 
cell instead of a medical facility with deliberate indifference to his 
medical/psychological needs. The only evidence the plaintiff presents in 
support of this is a report by Faith Liebman, a"Forensic Sexologist and 
Criminologist," which states that Edward Singletary was exhibiting 
various suicidal symptoms and then conclusorily opines that "the 
Department of Corrections exhibited a deliberate indifference to the 
needs of Mr. Singletary by ignoring these symptoms." Nowhere does the 
report address what Mazurkiewicz knew or must have known, and the 
plaintiff 's brief does not address this either. 
 
The plaintiff would have the burden of proving at trial that 
Mazurkiewicz was deliberately indifferent to the excessive risk to her 
son, 
which, as Farmer instructs us, would involve showing that Mazurkiewicz 
knew or was aware of that risk. The defendants contend that the record 
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complaint for abuse of discretion. See Urrutia v. Harrisburg 
County Police Dept., 91 F.3d 451, 457 (3d Cir. 1996). 
However, if we are reviewing the factual conclusions that a 
district court made while considering the Rule 15 motion, 
our standard of review is clear error. See Varlack v. SWC 
Caribbean, Inc., 550 F.2d 171, 174 (3d Cir. 1977). 
Furthermore, if the district court's decision regarding a 
Rule 15(c) motion was based on the court's interpretation of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, our review is plenary. 
See Lundy v. Adamar of New Jersey, Inc., 34 F.3d 1173, 
1177 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
A. Rule 15(c)(3) 
 
The parties agree that the statute of limitations for this 
action is two years, which expired on October 6, 1998, the 
day that Singletary filed her original complaint. The plaintiff 
then moved to amend her complaint by adding Regan as a 
defendant on July 28, 2000, almost two years after the 
statute of limitations had run. The plaintiff argues that this 
proposed amendment did not violate the statute of 
limitations because the amendment would relate back to 
the original, timely filed complaint under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 15(c)(3). Rule 15(c) can ameliorate the 
running of the statute of limitations on a claim by making 
the amended claim relate back to the original, timely filed 
complaint. See Nelson v. County of Allegheny, 60 F.3d 
1010, 1015 (3d Cir. 1995). Rule 15(c) provides: 
 
       (c) Relation Back of Amendments. An amendment of a 
       pleading relates back to the date of the original 
       pleading when 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
is lacking any evidence to support that claim, and in fact, the plaintiff 
does not dispute that contention. Instead, she argues that the burden is 
on the defendants to show the lack of a genuine issue of material fact as 
to Mazurkiewicz's deliberate indifference. This assertion, however, is 
clearly contrary to the Supreme Court jurisprudence on summary 
judgment as we outlined above; in order to survive a summary judgment 
motion in which the movant argues that there is an absence of evidence 
to support her case, the plaintiff must point to some evidence beyond her 
raw claim that Mazurkiewicz was deliberately indifferent. See Celotex, 
477 U.S. at 325. Because she failed to do that, the District Court was 
correct to grant summary judgment for Mazurkiewicz. 
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       (1) relation back is permitted by the law that 
       provides the statute of limitations applicable to 
       the action, or 
 
       (2) the claim or defense asserted in the amended 
       pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, 
       or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set 
       forth in the original pleading, or 
 
       (3) the amendment changes the party or the 
       naming of the party against whom a claim is 
       asserted if the foregoing provision (2) is satisfied 
       and, within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for 
       service of the summons and complaint, the 
       party to be brought in by amendment (A) has 
       received such notice of the institution of the 
       action that the party will not be prejudiced in 
       maintaining a defense on the merits, and (B) 
       knew or should have known that, but for a 
       mistake concerning the identity of the proper 
       party, the action would have been brought 
       against the party. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c). 
 
The issue in the case is whether the plaintiff can use 
15(c)(3) to have her amended complaint substituting Regan 
as a defendant in place of "Unknown Corrections Officers" 
relate back to her original complaint. The Rule is written in 
the conjunctive, and courts interpret 15(c)(3) as imposing 
three conditions, all of which must be met for a successful 
relation back of an amended complaint that seeks to 
substitute newly named defendants. See Urrutia , 91 F.3d at 
457. The parties do not dispute that the first condition-- 
that the claim against the newly named defendants must 
have arisen "out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence 
set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original 
pleading"--is met. The second and third conditions are set 
out in 15(c)(3)(A) & (B), respectively, and must be met 
"within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for service of the 
summons and complaint," Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(3), which is 
"120 days after the filing of the complaint," Fed. R. Civ. P. 
4(m). The second condition is that the newly named party 
must have "received such notice of the institution of the 
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action [within the 120 day period] that the party will not be 
prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits." Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 15(c)(3)(A). Urrutia states that this condition "has 
two requirements, notice and the absence of prejudice, each 
of which must be satisfied." 91 F.3d at 458. The third 
condition is that the newly named party must have known, 
or should have known, (again, within the 120 day period) 
that "but for a mistake" made by the plaintiff concerning 
the newly named party's identity, "the action would have 
been brought against" the newly named party in the first 
place. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(3)(B). 
 
Under these facts, we are concerned with three issues: (1) 
did Regan receive notice of the institution of the action 
before February 3, 2000 (which is 120 days after the 
complaint was filed); (2) was the notice that Regan received 
sufficient that he was not prejudiced in maintaining his 
defense; and (3) did Regan know (or should he have known) 
by February 3, 2000 that but for a mistake Singletary 
would have named him as a party in the original 
complaint? As explained above, the answers to all of these 
questions must be "Yes" for Singletary to prevail on her 
Rule 15(c)(3) argument. The District Court concluded that 
Regan did not receive any notice of the litigation or of his 
role in that litigation during the 120 day period. The court 
also concluded that Regan would be unfairly prejudiced by 
having to mount his defense at this late date, and that he 
neither knew nor should have known that, but for a 
mistake, he would have been named in the original 
complaint. 
 
Notice is the main issue, and we will address that first. 
For reasons that we set forth in the margin, the unfair 
prejudice issue is closely dependent on the outcome of our 
notice inquiry; because we agree with the District Court 
that Regan did not receive notice within the 120 day period 
(and because the District Court based its decision on notice 
and mentioned prejudice only in passing), we will not 
address prejudice.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Prejudice and notice are closely intertwined in the context of Rule 
15(c)(3), as the amount of prejudice a defendant suffers under 15(c)(3) is 
a direct effect of the type of notice he receives. See 6A Charles A. 
Wright 
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B. Notice 
 
This court has seldom spoken on the meaning of "notice" 
in the context of Rule 15(c)(3). Still, we can glean some 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
et al., Federal Practice And Procedure S 1498, at 123 (2d ed. 1990) ("A 
finding that notice, although informal, is sufficient . . . frequently 
[depends] upon determining whether the party to be added would be 
prejudiced by allowing relation back under the circumstances of the 
particular case."). That is, once it is established that the newly named 
defendant received some sort of notice within the relevant time period, 
the issue becomes whether that notice was sufficient to allay any 
prejudice the defendant might have suffered by not being named in the 
original complaint. 
 
If the newly named defendant received no notice, then it would appear 
unlikely that such non-notice was sufficient to allay the prejudice. We 
recognize that it is at least arguable that it is conceptually possible 
for 
a newly named defendant to have received no notice and yet not be 
prejudiced. But, since Rule 15(c)(3) does not appear to contemplate such 
a scenario, we will not undertake to express an opinion on that question. 
 
If Regan had received notice of the institution of this action within the 
120 day period, his failure to prepare a defense could be construed as 
"careless or myopic," so he would not be legitimately prejudiced because 
his "alleged prejudice results from his own superficial investigatory 
practices or poor preparation of a defense." Id. S 1498, at 126. The 
District Court, however, based its prejudice analysis on the premise that 
Regan received no such notice: 
 
       Singletary seeks $10,000,000 in various damages from the 
       Defendants. The underlying events occurred more than 4 years ago 
       and the trial is scheduled to commence in a very short time. 
       Subjecting Regan to such potential liability for the first time at 
this 
       late date on the eve of trial and requiring him to"set about 
       assembling evidence and constructing a defense when the case is 
       already stale," Nelson, 60 F.3d at 1015, would unfairly prejudice 
       him. 
 
Dist. Ct. Order #1, Sept. 20, 2000, at 11-12. Of course, if Regan had 
received notice earlier, he could have prepared his defense when the case 
was not so stale. We agree with the District Court that Regan did not 
receive any notice within the requisite time period, and we also agree 
that Regan would suffer prejudice by being forced to prepare his defense 
at this point. We have noted above that, arguably, a non-notice non- 
prejudice scenario is a conceptual possibility; but this case does not 
present such a situation. 
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general instruction from the few cases that address the 
issue. First, Rule 15(c)(3) notice does not require actual 
service of process on the party sought to be added; notice 
may be deemed to have occurred when a party who has 
some reason to expect his potential involvement as a 
defendant hears of the commencement of litigation through 
some informal means. See Varlack v. SWC Caribbean, Inc., 
550 F.2d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 1977) (holding that a person 
who the plaintiff sought to add as a defendant had 
adequate notice under 15(c)(3) when, within the relevant 
period, the person by happenstance saw a copy of the 
complaint naming both the place where he worked and an 
"unknown employee" as a defendant, which he knew 
referred to him); see also Berndt v. Tennessee , 796 F.2d 
879, 884 (6th Cir. 1986) (notice need not be formal); Eakins 
v. Reed, 710 F.2d 184, 187-88 (4th Cir. 1983) (same); Kirk 
v. Cronvich, 629 F.2d 404, 407-08 (5th Cir. 1980) (same). 
At the same time, the notice received must be more than 
notice of the event that gave rise to the cause of action; it 
must be notice that the plaintiff has instituted the action. 
See Bechtel v. Robinson, 886 F.2d 644, 652 n.12 (3d Cir. 
1989). 
 
The plaintiff does not argue that Regan received formal or 
even actual notice within the 120 day period; instead, she 
contends that Regan received "constructive or implied 
notice" of the institution of the action. She cites to several 
district court cases within this Circuit for the proposition 
that "notice concerning the institution of an action may be 
actual, constructive, or imputed." Id. (citing Keitt v. Doe, 
1994 WL 385333 at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 22, 1994); Heinly v. 
Queen, 146 F.R.D. 102, 107 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Kinnally v. 
Bell of Pennsylvania, 748 F. Supp. 1136, 1141 (E.D. 
Pa.1990)). The plaintiff then advances two methods of 
imputing notice to Regan that she argues are implicated 
here: (1) the shared attorney method (Regan received timely 
notice because he shared his attorney with SCI-Rockview, 
an originally named party); and (2) the identity of interest 
method (Regan received timely notice because he had an 
identity of interest with SCI-Rockview). The central question 
before us is whether the facts of this case support the 
application of one or the other of these forms of notice. 
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1. Notice via Sharing an Attorney with an Original 
       Defendant 
 
The "shared attorney" method of imputing Rule 15(c)(3) 
notice is based on the notion that, when an originally 
named party and the party who is sought to be added are 
represented by the same attorney, the attorney is likely to 
have communicated to the latter party that he may very 
well be joined in the action. This method has been accepted 
by other Courts of Appeals and by district courts within 
this Circuit. See Gleason v. McBride, 869 F.2d 688, 693 (2d 
Cir. 1989); Barkins v. Int'l Inns, Inc., 825 F.2d 905, 907 
(5th Cir. 1987); Berndt v. State of Tennessee , 796 F.2d 879, 
884 (6th Cir. 1986); Heinly, 146 F.R.D. at 107; Kinnally, 
748 F. Supp. at 1141. We endorse this method of imputing 
notice under Rule 15(c)(3). 
 
The relevant inquiry under this method is whether notice 
of the institution of this action can be imputed to Regan 
within the relevant 120 day period, i.e., by February 3, 
1999, by virtue of representation Regan shared with a 
defendant originally named in the lawsuit. The plaintiff 
contends that Regan shared an attorney with all of the 
originally named defendants; more precisely, she submits 
that appellees' attorney, Deputy (State) Attorney General 
Gregory R. Neuhauser, entered an appearance as "Counsel 
for Defendants" in the original lawsuit, and hence that 
Neuhauser represented the "several Unknown Corrections 
Officers" defendants, one of whom turned out to be Regan. 
The plaintiff submits that Neuhauser's investigation for this 
lawsuit must have included interviewing Regan (as he was 
one of the last counselors to evaluate Edward Singletary's 
mental state), so that Regan would have gotten notice of the 
institution of the lawsuit at that time. 
 
The plaintiff notes further that Neuhauser responded to 
all of the allegations in the complaint including those 
governing the unknown corrections officers; that Neuhauser 
defended at Regan's deposition; and that nothing in 
Neuhauser's Answer to the Complaint was inconsistent 
with jointly representing employees like Regan. The 
defendants counter that, even if Regan were made a 
defendant in this suit, Regan would not have to accept 
Neuhauser as his counsel: Pennsylvania law specifically 
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allows state employees to engage their own counsel when 
sued for actions taken in the course of their employment. 
See 4 Pa. Code S 39.13(a)(3) (2001). 
 
The plaintiff 's contentions raise an interesting issue: 
whether an attorney's original entry of appearance as 
"Counsel for Defendants" can be used to establish, at the 
time of that appearance, a sufficient relationship for Rule 
15(c)(3) notice purposes with a party who is later 
substituted as a defendant for a "John Doe" (or its 
functional equivalent) named in the original complaint. 
Because we are concerned with the notice that the newly 
named defendant received, the fundamental issue here is 
whether the attorney's later relationship with the newly 
named defendant gives rise to the inference that the 
attorney, within the 120 day period, had some 
communication or relationship with, and thus gave notice 
of the action to, the newly named defendant. 
 
In this case, however, the record is clear that Neuhauser 
did not become the attorney for the defendants until well 
after the relevant 120 day period had run. The plaintiff 
originally filed this action in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania on October 6, 1998. The action was then 
transferred to the Middle District of Pennsylvania; the order 
directing the clerk to transfer the case was entered on 
January 12, 1999, and that order and the original file were 
docketed by the Middle District on February 16, 1999. 
Neuhauser was substituted as counsel for the defendants 
on February 24, 1999, replacing John O.J. Shellenberger. 
The relevant 120 day period ended on February 3, 1999, so 
any representation and investigation (and contact with 
Regan) by Neuhauser did not begin until at least three 
weeks after the 120 day period ended. 
 
Therefore, even if we were to conclude that Neuhauser in 
some sense represented and thereby gave notice to Regan 
before Regan was sought to be named as a defendant, this 
does not help the plaintiff because Neuhauser's 
representation of the defendants commenced after the 120 
day period. Furthermore, the plaintiff has not made a 
"shared attorney" argument regarding the original attorney 
Shellenberger (the defendants' attorney of record during the 
120 day period), but even if she did, Shellenberger has not 
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represented, and will never represent, Regan at any point in 
this action. Because this case was quickly transferred to 
the Middle District, the record does not support the 
inference that any investigation of the case was performed 
that would have given Regan notice within the 120 days; 
that is, there is no evidence in the record that 
Shellenberger contacted Regan about this case or had any 
relationship with Regan at all. For these reasons, we reject 
the plaintiff 's argument that Regan obtained sufficient Rule 
15(c)(3) notice via the "shared attorney" method of imputing 
notice. 
 
2. Notice via an Identity of Interest with an Originally 
       named Defendant 
 
The "identity of interest" method of imputing Rule 15(c)(3) 
notice to a newly named party is closely related to the 
shared attorney method. Identity of interest is explained by 
one commentator as follows: "Identity of interest generally 
means that the parties are so closely related in their 
business operations or other activities that the institution 
of an action against one serves to provide notice of the 
litigation to the other." 6A Charles A. Wright et al., Federal 
Practice And Procedure S 1499, at 146 (2d ed. 1990). One 
could view the shared attorney method as simply a special 
case of, or as providing evidence for, the identity of interest 
method, in that sharing an attorney with an originally 
named party demonstrates that you share an identity of 
interest with that party. See, e.g., Jacobsen v. Osborne, 133 
F.3d 315, 320 (5th Cir. 1998) (using the fact that the 
parties shared an attorney as evidence that the identity of 
interest test was met). But cf. 3 James Wm. Moore, Moore's 
Federal Practice S 15.19[3][c], at 15-88 to 15-89 (3d ed. 
2001) ("Legal counsel shared by the original and new 
defendants is not sufficient to establish an identity of 
interest." (citing In re Integrated Res. Real Estate Ltd. P'ship 
Sec. Litig., 815 F. Supp. 620, 645 (S.D.N.Y. 1993))). 
However, because the parties and various district court 
cases within this Circuit treat identity of interest and 
shared attorney as separate methods of imputing Rule 
15(c)(3) notice, we will do likewise. See, e.g. , Keitt v. Doe, 
1994 WL 385333 (E.D. Pa. July 22, 1994). 
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In Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21 (1986), the Supreme 
Court seemingly endorsed the identity of interest method of 
imputing notice for Rule 15(c)(3): "Timely filing of a 
complaint, and notice within the limitations period to the 
party named in the complaint, permit imputation of notice 
to a subsequently named and sufficiently related party." Id. 
at 29. District courts within this Circuit have interpreted 
this passage to mean that the Supreme Court has accepted 
the identity of interest notice method, see, e.g., Keitt 1994 
WL 385333 at *4, and we find this reading of Schiavone 
plausible. At all events, we adopt it as a logical construction 
of the Rule. Thus, the relevant issue is whether Regan has 
a sufficient identity of interest with an originally named 
defendant to impute the notice that defendant received to 
Regan. 
 
The plaintiff does not substantially develop her identity of 
interest argument (she concentrates mainly on the shared 
attorney method of imputing notice), but she does advance 
the argument that Regan shared an identity of interest with 
SCI-Rockview because he was employed by SCI-Rockview. 
The question before us is therefore whether an employee in 
Regan's position (staff psychologist) is so closely related to 
his employer for the purposes of this type of litigation that 
these two parties have a sufficient identity of interest so 
that the institution of litigation against the employer serves 
to provide notice of the litigation to the employee. See 6A 
Wright et al., supra, S 1499 at 146. 
 
There is not a clear answer to this question in the case 
law. The parties do not cite, and we have not found, any 
Third Circuit case that addresses this issue. We have 
found, however, two cases from other Circuits and one 
district court case from within this Circuit that shed some 
light on this topic. In Ayala Serrano v. Lebron Gonzalez, 
909 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1990), the plaintiff, a prisoner in 
Puerto Rico, brought a S 1983 lawsuit alleging that a prison 
guard violated his civil rights by standing idly by as the 
plaintiff was stabbed seven times by other inmates in the 
Intensive Treatment Unit of the prison. The original 
complaint was filed pro se, and named as defendants the 
superintendent of the prison and the head administrator of 
the Puerto Rican prison system. The District Court allowed 
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the plaintiff 's amended complaint, which added the prison 
guard as a defendant, to relate back to the original 
complaint under Rule 15(c)(3), on the grounds that the 
identity of interest that the prison guard shared with the 
prison officials named in the original complaint meant that 
the notice given to the latter could be imputed to the 
former. 
 
The First Circuit held that the district court did not err 
in imputing notice to the prison guard based on the identity 
of interest he shared with the originally named prison 
officials. In finding this identity of interest, the Court of 
Appeals focused on the facts that the originally named 
defendants were the prison guard's superiors, the prison 
guard was present at the attack, and the guard continued 
to work in the Intensive Treatment Unit where the plaintiff 
remained as an inmate, subject to special protective 
measures (so the guard and the prisoner would likely have 
had further contact). Under these facts, the court held that 
"it is entirely reasonable to assume that [the prison guard] 
was notified or knew of the lawsuit commenced by[the 
prisoner] as a result of the assault." Id . at 13. 
 
In Jacobsen v. Osborne, 133 F.3d 315 (5th Cir. 1998), the 
plaintiff brought a S 1983 action against a named officer 
(Osborne) and several unnamed officers, along with state 
tort claims against the City of New Orleans and the Sheriff. 
The plaintiff sought to have his amended complaint 
replacing Osborne with the previously unnamed other 
officers relate back under Rule 15(c)(3). The Fifth Circuit 
held that the newly named defendants received constructive 
notice because there was a sufficient identity of interest 
between the newly named officers, Officer Osborne, and the 
City to infer notice. The court based this conclusion on the 
fact that "the City Attorney, who represented the original 
City defendants (the City and Officer Osborne) . . . would 
necessarily have represented the newly-named officers. The 
City Attorney answered the complaint on behalf of the City 
and Officer Osborne and, to do so, presumably investigated 
the allegations, thus giving the newly-named officers the 
[Rule 15(c)(3)] notice of the action." Id. at 320. 
 
In Keitt, 1994 WL 385333, the district court found that 
police officers employed by Amtrak did not have a sufficient 
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identity of interest with Amtrak for 15(c)(3) imputed notice 
purposes. The court stated that "[n]on-management 
employees, such as the officers herein, do not bear a 
sufficient nexus with their employer to permit a conclusion 
that they share an identity of interest in the litigation so as 
to permit the presumption that they received notice that 
they would be sued simply because their employer had 
timely notice." Id. at *6 (citing Perri v. Daggy, 776 F. Supp. 
1345 (N.D. Ind. 1991)). 
 
These cases demonstrate that this issue is a close one in 
this case. We believe, however, that Regan does not share 
sufficient identity of interest with SCI-Rockview so that 
notice given to SCI-Rockview can be imputed to Regan for 
Rule 15(c)(3) purposes. Regan was a staff level employee at 
SCI-Rockview with no administrative or supervisory duties 
at the prison. Thus, Regan's position at SCI-Rockview 
cannot alone serve as a basis for finding an identity of 
interest, because Regan was clearly not highly enough 
placed in the prison hierarchy for us to conclude that his 
interests as an employee are identical to the prison's 
interests. That is, Regan and SCI-Rockview are not"so 
closely related in their business operations or other 
activities that the institution of an action against one serves 
to provide notice of the litigation to the other." 6A Wright et 
al., supra, S 1499, at 146. 
 
Furthermore, the circumstances present in Ayala Serrano 
and Jacobsen that were the bases for the findings of 
identity of interest in those cases are not present in this 
case. In Ayala Serrano, the prison guard's continued close 
contact with the plaintiff led the court to conclude that the 
guard likely had notice of the instigation of the lawsuit. 
Here, Regan did not have such continuing contact with the 
plaintiff, so there is no similar basis for concluding that he 
would have received such notice. In Jacobsen, the key fact 
for the court was that the same City Attorney would likely 
have interviewed the newly named defendants soon after 
the lawsuit was filed, thus giving these defendants 
sufficient notice of the lawsuit within the relevant 120 day 
period. As we noted in the previous section, however, this 
case was originally filed in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania with a different attorney representing the 
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defendants, and it was only after the case was transferred 
to the Middle District that attorney Neuhauser began his 
representation of the defendants and investigation of the 
case--well after the 120 day period had expired. Because 
there is no evidence or any reason to believe that the 
previous attorney for the defendants represented or even 
contacted Regan, the basis for finding sufficient notice that 
existed in Jacobsen is not present here. 
 
Thus, we find ourselves in agreement with Keitt  that, 
absent other circumstances that permit the inference that 
notice was actually received, a non-management employee 
like Regan does not share a sufficient nexus of interests 
with his or her employer so that notice given to the 
employer can be imputed to the employee for Rule 15(c)(3) 
purposes. For this reason, we reject the plaintiff 's identity 
of interest argument, and conclude that the District Court 
did not err in denying the plaintiff leave to amend her 
complaint to add Regan as a defendant. 
 
C. But for a Mistake Concerning the Identity of the 
Proper Party 
 
Rule 15(c)(3)(B) provides a further requirement for 
relating back an amended complaint that adds or changes 
a party: the newly added party knew or should have known 
that "but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper 
party, the action would have been brought against the 
party." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(3)(B). The plaintiff argues that 
this condition is met in her proposed amended complaint, 
but the District Court found otherwise. The defendants also 
contend that (1) the plaintiff did not make a mistake as to 
Regan's identity, and (2) Regan did not know, nor should he 
have known, that the action would have been brought 
against him had his identity been known, because the 
original complaint named "Unknown Corrections Officers" 
and Regan is not a corrections officer but a staff 
psychologist. 
 
The issue whether the requirements of Rule 15(c)(3)(B) 
are met in this case is a close one. We begin by noting that 
the bulk of authority from other Courts of Appeals takes 
the position that the amendment of a "John Doe" complaint 
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--i.e., the substituting of real names for "John Does" or 
"Unknown Persons" named in an original complaint--does 
not meet the "but for a mistake" requirement in 15(c)(3)(B), 
because not knowing the identity of a defendant is not a 
mistake concerning the defendant's identity. See Wilson v. 
United States, 23 F.3d 559, 563 (1st Cir. 1994); Barrow v. 
Wethersfield Police Dept., 66 F.3d 466, 469 (2d Cir. 1995), 
amended by 74 F.3d 1366 (2d Cir. 1996); W. Contracting 
Corp. v. Bechtel Corp., 885 F.2d 1196, 1201 (4th Cir. 1989); 
Jacobsen v. Osborne, 133 F.3d 315, 320 (5th Cir. 1998); 
Cox v. Treadway, 75 F.3d 230, 240 (6th Cir. 1996); 
Worthington v. Wilson, 8 F.3d 1253, 1256 (7th Cir. 1993); 
Powers v. Graff, 148 F.3d 1223, 1226-27 (11th Cir. 1998). 
This is, of course, a plausible theory, but in terms of both 
epistemology and semantics is subject to challenge. 
 
In Varlack v. SWC Caribbean, Inc., 550 F.2d 171, 175 (3d 
Cir. 1977), this Court appeared to have reached the 
opposite conclusion insofar as we held that the amendment 
of a "John Doe" complaint met all of the conditions for Rule 
15(c)(3) relation back, including the "but for a mistake" 
requirement. In Varlack, the plaintiff had filed a complaint 
against, inter alia, an "unknown employee" of a branch of 
the Orange Julius restaurant chain, alleging that this 
employee had hit him with a two-by-four in a fight, which 
caused him to fall through a plate glass window, injuring 
his arm so severely that it had to be amputated. After the 
statute of limitations had run, the plaintiff sought to amend 
his complaint to change "unknown employee" to the 
employee's real name, using Rule 15(c)(3) to have the 
amended complaint relate back to the original. The newly 
named defendant testified that he had coincidentally seen 
a copy of the complaint naming both Orange Julius and an 
"unknown employee" as defendants, and that he had 
known at that time that he was the "unknown employee" 
referred to. This Court affirmed the district court's grant of 
the 15(c)(3) motion, holding that the plaintiff met all the 
requirements of 15(c)(3), including the requirement that the 
newly named defendant "knew or should have known but 
for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party." 
See id. at 175. 
 
We are, of course, bound by Varlack insofar as it held 
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that the plaintiff 's lack of knowledge of a particular 
defendant's identity can be a mistake under Rule 
15(c)(3)(B). See Internal Operating Procedures of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 9.1 (2000).4 
Moreover, as is also noted above, every other Court of 
Appeals that has considered this issue (specifically, the 
First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh 
Circuits) has come out contrary to Varlack; generally 
speaking, the analysis in these other cases centers on the 
linguistic argument that a lack of knowledge of a 
defendant's identity is not a "mistake" concerning that 
identity. However, even assuming that Varlack  allows for 
amended "John Doe" complaints to meet Rule 15(c)(3)(B)'s 
"mistake" requirement, it is questionable whether the other 
parts of 15(c)(3)(B) are met in this case, namely, whether 
Regan knew or should have known that he would have 
been named in the complaint if his identity were known. 
Because the original complaint named "Unknown 
Corrections Officers," it is surely arguable that psychologist 
Regan would have no way of knowing that the plaintiff 
meant to name him. 
 
These are sticky issues. Because, as we explained above, 
the plaintiff 's argument on the applicability of Rule 15(c)(3) 
to her case fails on notice grounds, we do not need to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We note, however, that two district court cases from within this 
Circuit have seemingly concluded that Varlack 's holding does not entail 
that amended "John Doe" complaints meet Rule 15(c)(3)(B)'s "mistake" 
requirement, as these cases have followed the rule of the other Circuits 
in denying the relation back of amended complaints that replace "John 
Doe" defendants because there was no mistake involved in the original 
complaints. See Gallas v. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1998 WL 
599249, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 1998); Frazier v. City of Philadelphia, 
927 F. Supp. 881, 885 (E.D. Pa. 1996). The majority of district court 
cases from within this Circuit that have considered this issue, however, 
have followed the broader interpretation of Varlack and thus allowed the 
relation back of amended "John Doe" complaints under Rule 15(c)(3). 
See, e.g., Trant v. Towamencin Township, 1999 WL 317032 at *5-*6 (E.D. 
Pa. 1999); Trautman v. Lagalski, 28 F. Supp. 2d 327, 330 (W.D. Pa. 
1998); Cruz v. City of Camden, 898 F. Supp. 1100, 1110 n.9 (D.N.J. 
1995); Advanced Power Sys., Inc. v. Hi-Tech Sys., Inc., 801 F. Supp. 
1450, 1457 (E.D. Pa. 1992). We think this to be the better reading of 
Varlack. 
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decide these questions here. We do, however, take this 
opportunity to express in the margin our concern over the 
state of the law on Rule 15(c)(3) (in particular the other 
Circuits' interpretation of the "mistake" requirement) and to 
recommend to the Advisory Rules Committee a modification 
of Rule 15(c)(3) to bring the Rule into accord with the 
weight of the commentary about it.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. As we note in the text, some Courts of Appeals have held that 
proposed amended complaints that seek to replace a"John Doe" or other 
placeholder name in an original complaint with a defendant's real name 
do not meet Rule 15(c)(3)(B)'s "but for a mistake" requirement. We find 
this conclusion to be highly problematic. It is certainly not uncommon 
for victims of civil rights violations (e.g., an assault by police 
officers or 
prison guards) to be unaware of the identity of the person or persons 
who violated those rights. This information is in the possession of the 
defendants, and many plaintiffs cannot obtain this information until they 
have had a chance to undergo extensive discovery following institution of 
a civil action. If such plaintiffs are not allowed to relate back their 
amended "John Doe" complaints, then the statute of limitations period 
for these plaintiffs is effectively substantially shorter than it is for 
other 
plaintiffs who bring the exact same claim but who know the names of 
their assailants; the former group of plaintiffs would have to bring their 
lawsuits well before the end of the limitations period, immediately begin 
discovery, and hope that they can determine the assailants' names 
before the statute of limitations expires. There seems to be no good 
reason to disadvantage plaintiffs in this way simply because, for 
example, they were not able to see the name tag of the offending state 
actor. 
 
The rejoinder to this argument is that allowing the relation back of 
amended "John Doe" complaints risks unfairness to defendants, who, 
under the countervailing Varlack interpretation of Rule 15(c)(3)(B), may 
have a lawsuit sprung upon them well after the statute of limitations 
period has run. But fairness to the defendants is accommodated in the 
other requirements of Rule 15(c)(3), namely the requirements that (1) the 
newly named defendants had received "such notice of the institution of 
the action" during the relevant time period "that the party will not be 
prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits"; and (2) the newly 
named defendants knew or should have known that the original 
complaint was really directed towards them ("the action would have been 
brought against the party"). These requirements generally take care of 
the "springing a claim on an unsuspecting defendant" problem. Because 
these other Rule 15(c)(3) requirements must be met before an amended 
complaint can relate back, the "mistake" requirement of 15(c)(3), as 
interpreted by the other Circuits, would be dispositive in disallowing 
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III. Conclusion 
 
For the above reasons, the District Court's grant of 
summary judgment for the defendants and the court's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
relation back only when the to-be-added defendants had timely notice of 
the lawsuit and knew that the lawsuit was really meant to be directed at 
them. We do not think that fairness requires that a plaintiff be barred 
from adding newly named parties as defendants when these newly 
named parties (1) knew about the lawsuit within the relevant time 
period, (2) knew they were the ones targeted, and (3) had the information 
as to their correct names but withheld that information from the plaintiff 
--indeed, we believe that fairness requires that a plaintiff in such a 
situation should be allowed to add the newly named defendants to his 
complaint. 
 
We also note that Rule 15(c)(3)(B)'s mistake requirement has been held 
to be met (and thus relation back clearly permitted) for an amended 
complaint that adds or substitutes a party when a plaintiff makes a 
mistake by suing the state but not individual officers in a S 1983 action. 
See Lundy v. Adamar of New Jersey, Inc., 34 F.3d 1173, 1192 n.13 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(listing 
cases in which plaintiffs have been permitted to have their complaints 
relate back when they made mistakes in the naming of defendants in 
their complaints, including naming states and state agencies instead of 
state officials in S 1983 cases). We think that it makes no sense to allow 
plaintiffs who commit such a clear pleading error to have their claims 
relate back, while disallowing such an option for plaintiffs who, usually 
through no fault of their own, do not know the names of the individuals 
who violated their rights. This disparity of treatment of S 1983 
plaintiffs 
seems to have no principled basis and should not be codified in our 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
 
All of the commentators who address this issue (at least those that we 
found in our research) call for Rule 15(c)(3) to allow relation back in 
cases in which a "John Doe" complaint is amended to substitute real 
defendants' names. See Edward H. Cooper, Rule 15(c)(3) Puzzles at 3-5 
(November 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Rules Committee 
Support Office); Carol M. Rice, Meet John Doe: It is Time for Federal 
Civil 
Procedure to Recognize John Doe Parties, 57 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 883, 952-53 
(1996); Steven S. Sparling, Note, Relation Back of "John Doe" Complaints 
in Federal Courts: What You Don't Know Can Hurt You , 19 Cardozo L. 
Rev. 1235 (1997) (arguing that the structure, purpose, history and 
development of Rule 15(c) all cut in favor of allowing relation back of 
amended John Doe complaints). 
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order denying the plaintiff's motion to amend her 
complaint will be affirmed. The Clerk is directed to send 
copies of this opinion to the Chairman and Reporter of the 
Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and 
the Standing Committee on Practice and Procedure, calling 
attention to footnote 5. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
In his manuscript "Rule 15(c)(3) Puzzles," Professor Edward H. Cooper 
of the University of Michigan Law School suggests the following 
alteration (in italics) in subsection 15(c)(3)(B) of the Rule in order to 
make it clear that the relation back of "John Doe" amended complaints 
is allowed: "the party to be brought in by amendment . . . knew or 
should have known that, but for a mistake or lack of information 
concerning the identity of the proper party . . . ." Cooper, supra, 
(manuscript at 8). We believe that a change in Rule 15(c)(3) along the 
lines advocated by Professor Cooper would fix the lack of fairness to 
plaintiffs with "John Doe" complaints that currently inheres in the other 
Circuits' interpretation of the Rule, and would bring the Rule more 
clearly into alignment with the liberal pleading practice policy of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
 
For these reasons, we encourage the Rules Advisory Committee to 
amend Rule 15(c)(3) so that it clearly embraces the Cooper approach to 
the relation back of "John Doe" complaints. As the Supreme Court has 
said, "the requirements of the rules of procedure should be liberally 
construed and . . . `mere technicalities' should not stand in the way of 
consideration of a case on its merits." Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 
487 U.S. 312, 316 (1988). Rule 15(c)(3) is clearly meant to further the 
policy of considering claims on their merits rather than dismissing them 
on technicalities, and this policy is substantially furthered by the 
Cooper 
approach to Rule 15(c)(3)(B). 
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